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Arbitration clauses appear in a wide variety of the form contracts 
through which consumers obtain goods, services and credit, as well as in 
employment agreements, and other contracts of ordinary individuals.  
These “adhesive” agreements to arbitrate are generally enforced by 
courts, but this enforcement is quite controversial.1  Countless law 
review articles criticize it,2 while the few that defend it are usually 
 
 1. Several major newspapers have run stories on the topic, see, e.g., Reynolds 
Holding, Private Justice, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 2001, at A1; Caroline E. Mayer, 
Hidden in Fine Print: “You Can’t Sue Us”, WASH. POST, May 22, 1999, at A1; 
Barry Meier, In Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 
1997, at A1; Jane Spencer, Signing Away Your Right to Sue, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 
2003, at D1., and many bills have been introduced in Congress to stop enforcement 
of some or all adhesive arbitration agreements; see, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Is the 
U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and 
Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 
840 (2002) (citing bills). 
 2. See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in 
Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Mark E. 
Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 133 (2004); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and 
Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331; Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and 
Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements 
Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); Margaret M. 
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limited in important ways.3  This Article defends the general enforcement 
of adhesive arbitration agreements. 
Section I shows that this general enforcement is socially desirable 
and that it benefits most consumers, employees, and other adhering 
parties.  Section II introduces the doctrines on which courts most 
commonly rely in refusing to enforce particular adhesive arbitration 
agreements, the unconscionability and “effectively vindicate” doctrines, 
and applies them to typical adhesive arbitration agreements, that is, 
agreements whose enforcement would send an individual’s claims (as 
opposed to a class action) to arbitration under a process which requires 
that individual to incur costs comparable to, or lower than, the costs that 
 
Harding, The Redefinition of Arbitration by Those with Superior Bargaining Power, 
1999 UTAH L. REV. 857; Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet 
Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (2002); Margaret L. Moses, 
Privatized “Justice”, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535 (2005); David S. Schwartz, 
Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights 
Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L REV. 33; Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and 
the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (1996); Jean R. Sternlight, 
Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for 
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, 
Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 
N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999). 
 3. Some are limited to defending enforcement only in a particular context, such 
as employment agreements. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to 
Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997); David 
Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey, & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of 
Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and 
Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73 (1999).  
Others are limited in offering only tentative or qualified support for enforcement.  
See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 695, 741 & 771-72 (suggesting benefits of enforcement, but taking no position 
on  “the possibility that corporations pass on the benefits of arbitration to their 
customers,” and concluding that “in one-time consumer transactions and when 
arbitration agreements do not provide for administration by an independent arbitral 
institution—courts and legislatures may view more skeptically claims that 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are beneficial”); Keith N. Hylton, 
Agreements to Waiver or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 209 (2000) (“[S]uggest[ing] a presumption in favor of enforcing 
these agreements, especially where parties are informed. Exceptions to this 
presumption largely should be based on informational disparities.”); Yifat Pud, An 
Economic Analysis of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts, available at 
http://www.frg.eur.nl/rile/emle/Theses/pud.pdf 32 (2002) (“[T]he significant source 
of market distortions that ought to be treated by regulation is asymmetric 
information.”). 
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would have been incurred in litigating her claims.  Section II concludes 
that typical adhesive arbitration agreements are generally enforceable 
under a proper application of the unconscionability doctrine, and are 
probably enforceable under the “effectively vindicate” doctrine. 
Sections III and IV apply the unconscionability and “effectively 
vindicate” doctrines to two issues that are now hotly contested in the 
courts: an arbitration agreement’s prohibition of class actions (discussed 
in Section III) and the costs of pursuing a claim in arbitration (discussed 
in Section IV).  Section III argues that courts too often refuse to enforce 
adhesive arbitration agreements that prohibit class adjudication and that 
this unwarranted refusal is typically due to the courts’ misapplication of 
the unconscionability doctrine.  Section IV discusses adhesive arbitration 
agreements held unenforceable simply because they require plaintiffs to 
pay forum fees higher than those required in litigation.  Courts making 
this holding erroneously treat one cost of arbitration—the forum fee that 
pays the arbitrator and arbitration organization—in isolation, when they 
should be comparing the total costs of pursuing a claim in arbitration 
with the total costs the plaintiff would face in litigation.  Under this 
standard, most adhesive arbitration agreements should survive costs-
based challenges because the streamlined process of most arbitrations 
will result in process-cost savings for plaintiffs that more than offset the 
difference in filing fees. 
I.  THE BASIC ANALYSIS OF ADHESIVE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
A.  Reducing Costs and Passing on the Savings 
Few doubt that enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements 
benefits the businesses that use such agreements.  This consensus is 
unsurprising; if businesses using these agreements did not benefit from 
them, why would they continue to use them?  The consensus view is that 
businesses using adhesive arbitration agreements do so because those 
businesses generally find that those agreements lower their dispute-
resolution costs.4 
 
 4. Research revealed no doubt about this premise among consumer 
arbitration’s many critics or its few defenders.  There is one scholar who doubts that 
employers benefit from adhesive arbitration agreements with their employees, see 
Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using 
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399 (2000), but 
that is different from doubting that those employers that use such agreements tend 
to benefit from them.  Of course, it is possible that some businesses using adhesive 
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In the case of consumer arbitration agreements, this benefit to 
businesses is also a benefit to consumers.  That is because whatever 
lowers costs to businesses tends over time to lower prices to consumers.  
While the entire cost-savings is passed on to consumers only under 
conditions of perfect competition,5 some of the cost-savings is passed on 
to consumers under non-competitive conditions, even monopoly.6  The 
extent to which cost-savings are passed on to consumers is determined 
 
arbitration agreements are acting against their own interests by doing so.  People 
make mistakes.  Similarly, it is possible that some businesses that choose not to use 
arbitration agreements are acting against their own interests.  Given the variety of 
businesses and their situations, it seems likely that adhesive arbitration agreements 
are in the interests of some businesses, but not others.  This Article argues, not that 
all businesses would benefit from using adhesive arbitration or even that all 
businesses using adhesive arbitration benefit from it, but only that businesses using 
adhesive arbitration tend to benefit from it. 
 5. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 7 (6th ed. 
2003) (“The forces of competition tend to make opportunity cost the maximum as 
well as minimum price.”); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial 
Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 91-93. 
 6. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 5, at 276 & Figure 9.4 (“If costs fall (unless 
these are fixed costs), the optimum monopoly price will fall and output will rise.”), 
and “virtually all costs are variable in the long run.” Id. at 123.  A good explanation 
of this point is Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Efficiencies from the 
Consumer Viewpoint, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 707 (1999). 
  To begin with the extreme case of a monopolist, price will decrease when 
marginal cost decreases. This claim is unexceptional to any student of intermediate 
microeconomics.  However, we have been continually surprised over the years that 
many lawyers at the antitrust agencies refuse to accept this proposition and instead 
claim that a monopolist will “pocket the cost savings” and not pass any of them on 
to consumers. This claim is based on the incorrect assertion that only competition 
forces a firm to pass along cost savings. In fact, however, profit maximization by 
the firm causes it to pass along at least some of the cost savings in terms of a lower 
price, even if the firm is a monopolist. 
  Why does profit maximizing behavior cause a monopolist to pass along to 
consumers some of the cost savings? A monopolist sets its price so that marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost. If the monopolist lowers its price (by a small 
amount), three effects result. First, the monopolist achieves lower revenue on its 
existing unit sales; second, it sells more units because of the lower price; and third, 
its total costs increase because of the extra production.  At the profit maximizing 
optimum, the net effect of these three terms is zero—they cancel each other out.  
However, if the last term, which is the cost of the extra production, becomes 
smaller due to efficiencies, the total net effect becomes positive because the added 
revenue from the price decrease exceeds the added production cost.  Thus, the 
monopolist can increase its profits by reducing its price, causing marginal revenue 
and marginal cost to be equal once again. 
Id. at 708-09 (citations omitted). 
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by the elasticity of supply and demand in the relevant markets.7  
Therefore, the size of the price reduction caused by enforcement of 
consumer arbitration agreements will vary, as will the time it takes to 
occur.  But it is inconsistent with basic economics to question the 
existence of the price reduction.8 
The analogous point can be made about the effect on wages of the 
enforcement of employment arbitration agreements.  While one can 
question the size or timing of the wage increase caused by this 
enforcement, it is inconsistent with basic economics to question the 
 
 7. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency 
and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 367 (1991).  
Craswell points out that the analysis becomes more complicated if the source of the 
cost-savings (here arbitration) affects consumers’ willingness to pay for the goods 
or services in question, and the analysis becomes still more complicated if 
consumers, rather than being homogeneous, have varying preferences. Id. at 368-83.  
These complications are not present in the context of adhesion arbitration 
agreements if we accept the contention, often made by opponents of such 
agreements, that adhering parties rarely notice arbitration clauses at the time of 
contracting.  See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking 
the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 
691 (1996) (“Arbitration clauses are often buried in seemingly insignificant places, 
camouflaged as insignificant junk mail, written in very small print, and written in 
technical terms not likely to be meaningful to most.”).  If adhering parties do not 
notice the arbitration clause, then the clause cannot implicate adhering parties’ 
willingness to pay or varying preferences. 
 8. Some scholars want to see empirical evidence before accepting economic 
theory’s prediction that, by lowering costs to businesses, arbitration tends over time 
to lower prices to consumers.  Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, 
and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to 
Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 851 (2004) (“there is 
nothing to suggest that vendors imposing arbitration clauses actually lower their 
prices in conjunction with using arbitration clauses in their contracts.”); Jean R. 
Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class 
Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 95 (2004) (“[N]o published studies show that the imposition 
of mandatory arbitration leads to lower prices.”). 
  There is also an absence of “published studies” and other empirical evidence 
showing that arbitration does not tend over time to lower prices.  In the absence of 
empirical study, should one presume the predictions of economic theory or the 
opposite?  Consistent with economic theory, there is anecdotal evidence that some 
businesses are willing to lower prices for consumers who accept arbitration.  See, 
e.g., Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1410, 1412-13 (M.D. 
Ala.1998) (consumer had choice between arbitration and 16.96% interest rate, and 
no arbitration and a 18.96% rate).  
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existence of it.9  This point applies similarly with respect to adhesive 
arbitration agreements in other contexts as well.  It is merely an example 
of the general insight that contract terms favorable to sellers go hand-in-
hand with lower prices.  “Recognition of this has been standard in the 
law-and-economics literature for at least a quarter of a century.”10 
B.  The Source(s) of the Cost Reduction 
While there is consensus that the enforcement of adhesive 
arbitration agreements lowers the dispute-resolution costs of the 
businesses that use them, there is uncertainty about the source(s) of this 
cost-reduction.  One possible source is that comparable cases brought by 
adhering parties, such as consumers and employees, generally lead to 
lower awards in arbitration than in litigation.  This is the story of 
arbitration as “self-help deregulation” for business.  If a business wants 
to reduce the legal liability imposed by, for example, consumer 
protection regulation, the business does not need to work for change 
through the political system; it can use self-help to reduce its liability by 
requiring its customers to agree to arbitration.  If this “self-help 
 
 9. Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to 
the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735, 747-51 
(2001). 
 10. Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of 
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 92. 
The law-and-economics literature features debate about the existence of, and 
proper response to, the problem of imperfect information causing unregulated 
form contract terms to be too harsh to the consumer with respect to terms 
about which consumers are often ignorant and (therefore) too favorable to the 
consumer with respect to those terms, such as price, about which consumers 
are typically knowledgeable. 
Id.  In other words, one must distinguish between two arguments, one modest and 
the other ambitious, about the terms of form contracts.  The modest argument 
(which this Article makes) is that the addition of a contract term that benefits sellers 
(businesses) yields a quid pro quo “in the form of lower prices or some other change 
[in contract terms] favoring consumers.”  Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as 
Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 
29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 212 n.95 (1998).  The ambitious argument is that the 
quid pro quo consumers get is necessarily sufficient to make the terms of form 
contracts efficient “in the sense that buyers would prefer the price/term combination 
offered by sellers to any other economically feasible price/term combination.” 
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1216 (2003) (providing an excellent 
summary of this ambitious argument, id. at 1208-16, before rejecting it in the rest of 
the article.). 
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deregulation” story is true, then enforcement of arbitration agreements 
has costs to consumers and employees (lower awards and, therefore, 
lower settlements,)11 as well as benefits (lower prices or higher wages). 
By contrast, a different possible source of arbitration’s cost-savings 
to business defendants is that arbitration reduces the business defendant’s 
process costs—the time and legal fees spent on pleadings, discovery, 
motions, trial or hearing, and appeal.  It is possible that the amount of 
awards is identical in arbitration and litigation but the business 
defendant’s cost of getting to the award is lower in arbitration.  If this is 
true—if all arbitration’s benefits to the business defendant come from 
lower process costs—then arbitration benefits both parties to the 
contract.  The process-cost savings benefit consumers and employees, 
who receive better prices or wages, and benefit the business defendant to 
the extent the business did not pass on the cost-savings arbitration 
produced. 
The only harm from process-cost savings comes to those (like 
lawyers) who sell process.12  But even this is a benefit to society as a 
whole. 
To the extent that the costs of adjudication are reduced, disputes can 
be resolved more efficiently, i.e., fewer resources need to be devoted 
to adjudication.  Some bright young people who would have 
become trial lawyers enter other fields instead.  Whatever those 
people produce is a gain to society from the cost savings of 
arbitration.13 
 
 11. Settlement negotiation is conducted “in the shadow” of the expected result 
of adjudication.  See, e.g., STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 
1.7(c) (2001). 
 12. To the extent enforceable arbitration agreements reduce the need for the 
services of business litigators, those litigators’ interests are at odds with the interests 
of their clients.  For an observation about the interests of plaintiffs’ lawyers, see 
infra note 13. 
 13. Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Under Assault: Trial Lawyers Lead the 
Charge, CATO Institute Policy Analysis No. 433, April 18, 2002, at 9, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1292. 
  In this respect, the business defendant’s process-cost savings from 
arbitration differ from the savings a business achieves, as in Carnival Cruise Lines, 
Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), by a forum-selection clause that relegates claims 
against it to a forum that it finds geographically convenient.  “As to the . . . savings 
to the cruise line, due to not having to defend suits in remote locations, there is a 
corollary increase in expenses to those passengers who must litigate far from 
home.”  Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 49, 66 (1995).  
By contrast, as to the business defendant’s process-cost savings from arbitration, 
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So the happy story about adhesive arbitration agreements is that they are 
all about reducing process costs.  They do not affect the outcomes of 
cases in any significant or systematic way; they merely get to the 
outcomes more efficiently.  According to this story, arbitration arising out 
of adhesive agreements is an entrepreneurial, private-sector innovation 
producing what disputing parties want: quick, inexpensive, common-
sense adjudication of disputes.  By contrast, civil litigation in the public-
sector court system is slow and archaic, full of legalistic jargon, 
technicalities and formalities that produce a lot more work for lawyers 
without producing a corresponding increase in justice for the disputing 
parties who have to pay the lawyers.  It is even possible that the amount 
of awards on consumer and employee claims is higher in arbitration than 
in litigation but the business defendant’s process costs in arbitration are 
so much lower in arbitration that, for the business, the process-cost 
savings outweighs the increase in payments for awards and settlements. 
Of course, the happy story that adhesive arbitration agreements just 
reduce process costs and the “self-help deregulation” story that such 
agreements just lower awards are not the only two possibilities.  It is 
possible that adhesive arbitration results in both lower process costs for 
the business defendant and generally lower awards for adhering parties 
like consumers and employees.  And it is possible—the following section 
suggests likely14—that, in addition to lowering process costs, adhesive 
arbitration tends to result in lower awards for some types of cases but 
higher awards in other types of cases. 
C.  Empirical Studies and Their Inherent Limits 
The previous paragraphs show that the sources of arbitration’s 
benefit to the business defendant matter in assessing the costs and 
benefits to adhering parties of enforcing arbitration agreements.  It would 
be useful if empirical studies could reveal the extent to which each 
possible source is, in fact, contributing to arbitration’s benefit to the 
business defendant.  Unfortunately, this is not possible. 
Empirical studies can tell us the relative levels of awards and process 
costs in arbitration and litigation, but that does not mean they can tell us 
the relative levels of awards and process costs in arbitration and 
 
there is no reason to expect a corollary increase in expenses to plaintiffs.  In fact, 
there is likely also a reduction in the plaintiff’s process costs.  Plaintiffs’ costs of 
pursuing claims in arbitration are discussed in Section IV of this article, infra. 
 14. See infra Section I.C. 
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litigation in comparable cases. The probative value we give to 
empirical studies should turn on our level of confidence that the studied 
cases going to arbitration are comparable to the studied cases going to 
litigation.  And, in reality, nobody knows whether the cases going to 
arbitration are comparable to the cases going to litigation. . . . 
In other areas of study, a scholar can (to a great extent) overcome this 
methodological problem. Suppose, for example, that a court requires 
mediation of all cases with odd docket numbers, but not of cases with 
even docket numbers. A scholar could then compare the results of the 
odd cases to the results of the even cases and attribute any differences 
to the rule requiring mediation. With a sufficiently large sample size, 
we would be quite confident that the odd cases are comparable to the 
even cases. That is because the odd and even docket numbers are 
completely unrelated to anything that might plausibly affect the results 
of the cases. 
In contrast, the selection of cases between arbitration and litigation is 
very different. [C]ases go to arbitration when, and only when, there is 
an arbitration agreement. The [parties that] use arbitration agreements 
may be systematically different from the [parties that] do not use 
arbitration agreements.15 
In sum, “[e]mpirical studies are vulnerable to the possibility that the 
studied cases going to arbitration are systematically different from the 
studied cases going to litigation.”16 Therefore, in comparing arbitration 
and litigation, we must be cautious about how much weight we give 
empirical studies. 
That said, the empirical evidence supports the aforementioned 
hypotheses that (1) reduced process costs are a significant source of the 
cost-savings businesses derive from arbitration,17 and (2) that arbitration 
tends to result in lower awards for some types of cases but higher awards 
in other types of cases.18  The empirical studies, which have been in the 
 
 15. Ware, supra note 9, at 755-56 (citations omitted). 
 16. Id at 336.  David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing 
the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1564-66 (2005). 
 17. Ware, supra note 9, at 753-55 (citing and summarizing studies).  That 
arbitration reduces process costs is confirmed by survey evidence.  See ABA 
SECTION OF LITIGATION TASK FORCE ON ADR EFFECTIVENESS, SURVEY ON 
ARBITRATION (August 2003) at 19, available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/tas 
kforces/adr/surveyreport.pdf. 
 18. Ware, supra note 9, at 753-55 (citing and summarizing studies). 
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area of employment arbitration, indicate that employees win a higher 
percentage of their claims in arbitration than in litigation but employees 
who win in litigation win more money than employees who win in 
arbitration.19  The anecdotes I have heard from practicing lawyers 
suggest similar results in consumer arbitration: claims that would result 
in big-dollar jury awards tend to see lower awards in arbitration, but 
smaller-yet-meritorious claims, some of which might not be cost-
effective to pursue at all in litigation, tend to see higher awards in 
arbitration. 
If this empirical/anecdotal picture is accurate, then adhesive 
arbitration agreements give consumers and employees (1) better prices or 
wages and (2) extra leverage in small-yet- meritorious cases, but (3) 
reduced leverage in cases that could lead to a big-dollar jury award.  For 
the vast majority of consumers and employees, the benefits of 1 and 2 
outweigh the costs of 3 because it is the rare consumer or employee who 
actually has a claim that could lead to a big-dollar jury award.20  If such a 
 
 19. Id. There is also a more recent study comparing employment arbitration and 
litigation. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth T. Hill, Employment Arbitration and 
Litigation: An Empirical Comparison (Mar. 5, 2003) (unpublished draft), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=389780.  It shows higher employee-win rates in 
arbitration when comparing the litigation of claims by all employees with only the 
arbitration of claims by higher-income employees, that is, employees whose 
agreement was negotiated, rather than promulgated.  Id. at 13-14.  The study makes 
this comparison between all litigation and only the arbitration of higher-income 
employees based on the assumption that “the economics of obtaining counsel 
effectively exclude most lower-pay employees from litigation.” Id.  This study finds 
an “absence of evidence of significantly different award amounts between higher 
pay employee arbitrations and tried cases,” id. at 19, although it shows higher mean 
awards in litigation than in arbitration.  Id. at 18.  See also Theodore Eisenberg & 
Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical 
Comparison, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 44.  For a closely related 
paper, see Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of 
Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration 
Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777 (2003). 
 20. One might argue that the business misconduct deterred by big-dollar claims 
(and the threat of them) benefits all adhering parties, including the vast majority 
who will never themselves have such a claim.  Supporting this argument would 
require a showing that the optimal level of deterrence is provided by the higher level 
of damages awarded in litigation rather than the lower level of damages awarded in 
arbitration.  Of course, over-deterrence is as much a social cost as under-deterrence.  
See Christopher R. Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated International Arbitration Awards: 
An Economic Approach, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 451 (2000). 
If the expected damage award in arbitration is closer to the optimal level than the 
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dispute has already arisen, however, the price that a particular consumer 
or employee will charge for giving up 3 increases dramatically.  In other 
words, it is entirely rational for a consumer, or employee, or other 
adhering party to prefer, at the time of contracting, that an arbitration 
clause be in the contract even if, at the time of a particular dispute, the 
adhering party prefers that an arbitration clause not be in the contract. 
D.  The Importance of Enforcing Pre-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate 
In discussing arbitration agreements, it is crucial to distinguish 
between pre-dispute agreements formed at the time of contracting and 
post-dispute agreements formed after a particular dispute has arisen.  
Critics of adhesive arbitration agreements conclude that arbitration must 
be bad for consumers and employees if businesses have to impose it 
through pre-dispute adhesion contracts, in which the arbitration clause is 
unlikely to be noticed by the consumer or employee, let alone the focus 
of attention.  If arbitration really was good for them, consumers and 
employees would choose it post-dispute, when they have had time to 
consider (perhaps in consultation with a lawyer) the pros and cons of 
arbitration versus litigation.21  According to this view, only post-dispute 
 
expected damage award in litigation, all else equal, arbitration will better deter 
wrongful conduct under the contract than litigation—i.e., arbitration will have 
“deterrence benefits.” Deterrence benefits can result either from increasing the 
level of deterrence if the expected damages in court are too low (avoiding 
underdeterrence), or from decreasing the level of deterrence if the expected 
damages in court are too high (avoiding overdeterrence). 
Id. at 465-66 (citation omitted).  See also Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. 
Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise 
Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 581 (2003) (examining hypothesis “that 
contracting parties will choose the dispute resolution forum in which the difference 
between deterrence benefits, defined as avoided harms net of avoidance costs, and 
dispute resolution costs is the largest” and providing “empirical 
analysis. . .demonstrat[ing] the relative importance of deterrence factors in the 
decision to choose a dispute resolution forum”); id. at 580 (“Holding dispute 
resolution costs fixed, parties will structure their contract so that future disputes are 
resolved within the forum that provides the optimal level of deterrence against 
undesirable conduct. Thus, if expected damages in court exceed or fall below the 
optimal level, and expected damages under arbitration are closer to the optimal 
level, they will have an incentive to commit to arbitration.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Common Sense and Contracts Symposium: The 
Gateway Thread—AALS Contracts Listserv, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1147, 1167 (2000) 
(“Consumer ‘choice’ of arbitration can only be meaningful if it is a post-dispute 
choice, when the consumer is represented by counsel who can evaluate the system’s 
rules. The best way to reform arbitration systems is to make pre-dispute arbitration 
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arbitration agreements should be enforced. 
Limiting enforcement to post-dispute agreements, however, would 
fail to produce all the social gains produced by enforcing pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements.  That is because the social gains resulting from 
arbitration’s lower process costs22 will not be realized nearly as often if 
an enforceable arbitration agreement can only be made after a dispute 
arises.  Neither party is likely to agree, post-dispute, to arbitrate claims 
for which arbitration is expected to be less favorable to that party than 
litigation would be.23  Thus post-dispute arbitration agreements are 
unlikely to occur even if both parties believe that the process costs (for 
both sides) are lower in arbitration than litigation. 
 
clauses unenforceable in consumer contracts, so that the arbitration systems view 
consumers as customers as much as the businesses they deal with.”); Charles 
Knapp, Common Sense and Contracts Symposium:  The Gateway Thread—AALS 
Contracts Listserv, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1147, 1173 (2000) (“I think Jean Braucher 
has hit the nail in precisely the right place—if arbitration is so economically sound 
for everybody, then let the consumer be persuaded ‘once the dispute has arisen’ that 
arbitration is in her best interests too.  The argument that ‘but then the consumer 
might have a lawyer’ obviously proves too much.”). 
 22. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 23. Several commentators have made this point with respect to employment 
arbitration. Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate 
Over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 559 (2001). 
If the former employee cannot obtain counsel, it is not in the employer’s interest to offer 
arbitration because the lower costs of arbitration will make more likely the pressing of a 
claim that otherwise simply would languish in the administrative agency. If, on the other 
hand, the former employee’s economic losses are high enough to attract competent 
counsel, that lawyer is exceedingly unlikely (absent unusual circumstances) to proffer 
arbitration even if the lawyer would prefer not to go to trial. The reason the proffer will 
not be made is because it is not in the client’s interest to do so, for such a proffer reduces 
the settlement value of the case as it takes off the table the in terrorem effect of a jury 
trial. 
Id. at 567-68.  Accord David Sherwyn, Because it Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute 
Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with 
Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 
(2003); id. at 57 (“[P]laintiffs’ and defense lawyers will rarely, if ever, 
simultaneously select to arbitrate the same case.”); Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the 
Frying Pan, Into the Fire: The Feasibility of Post-Dispute Employment Arbitration 
Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313, 314 (2003) (“This evidence indicates 
that most employees will not be able to secure their employer’s agreement to 
arbitrate once the dispute arises. The vast majority of employment disputes, 
however, do not involve enough damages to support contingent fee litigation. 
Therefore, outlawing pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate will leave many employees 
with no access to justice.”). 
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By contrast, pre-dispute agreements are formed at a time when both 
parties are uncertain about whether there will be a dispute and, if so, 
what sort of dispute it will be.24  That is the time when both sides have an 
incentive to choose the forum that reduces process costs.  This explains 
why enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements benefits 
consumers and employees as a whole even though it would be against 
some particular consumers’ and employees’ interests to agree to 
arbitration once a dispute has arisen.25  In sum, the general enforcement 
of adhesive arbitration agreements benefits society as a whole by 
reducing process costs and, in particular, benefits most consumers, 
employees and other adhering parties.26 
II.  THE UNCONSCIONABILITY AND “EFFECTIVELY VINDICATE” 
 DOCTRINES 
A.  Unconscionability Generally: Ex Ante, Not Ex Post 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, requires general enforcement of adhesive arbitration 
agreements.27  Section 2 requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements 
“save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.”28  As the Supreme Court explained in Doctor’s Associates, 
Inc. v. Casarotto,29 
 
 24. Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 695, 746. 
 25. It also explains why the interests of lawyers who represent consumer and 
employee plaintiffs are opposed to the interests of consumers and employees as a 
whole.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers represent the few consumers and employees who are 
harmed by enforceable arbitration agreements, that is, the few consumers and 
employees who have claims that could lead to a big-dollar jury award.  By contrast, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers do not represent the majority of consumers and employees who 
benefit from arbitration, that is, those who never have a dispute (but benefit from 
the better price or wage) and those who have the sort of small-yet-meritorious case 
that does not attract a lawyer to take the case to court. 
  For an observation about the interests of lawyers who litigate on behalf of 
business defendants, see supra note 12. 
 26. Furthermore, this enforcement does not make arbitration “mandatory.” See 
Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State 
Constitutional Jury-Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 40-44 (2003). 
 27. FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000). 
 28. Id. § 2. 
 29. 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
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[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or 
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements 
without contravening [FAA] § 2 . . . . Courts may not, however, 
invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to 
arbitration provisions. By enacting § 2, we have several times said, 
Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for 
suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed upon the 
same footing as other contracts.30 
In short, FAA section 2 requires parties to rely on contract law in 
objecting to enforcement of arbitration agreements.  Other sources of 
law—such as employment law or “consumer protection” statutes—are 
out of bounds and thus cannot provide the grounds for a court’s 
conclusion that a particular arbitration agreement is unenforceable.  Only 
contract law can provide such grounds.31 
Unconscionability is the contract-law ground on which courts most 
often rely in denying enforcement to adhesive arbitration agreements.32  
Unconscionability is generally thought of as coming in two forms: 
substantive unconscionability and procedural unconscionability.  
Substantive unconscionability, according to the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, means “terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party,”33 
 
 30. Id. at 686-87 (citations omitted) (quoting Scherk v. Alberlo-Culver Co., 417 
U.S. 506, 511 (1974)). 
 31. Does this legal doctrine conflict with the constitutional law regarding the 
right to jury trial?  Compare Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and 
the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 669 (2001) (arguing that FAA’s contract-law standards of consent are 
inconsistent with jury-waiver standards of consent), with Stephen J. Ware, 
Mandatory Arbitration: Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other 
Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 
(2004) (arguing that FAA’s contract-law standards of consent are consistent with 
jury-waiver standards of consent) and Ware, supra note 26, at 39 (same). 
 32. See generally Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the 
Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability 
Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 757 (2004); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After 
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001 (1996). 
Arguments based on other contract-law grounds are generally heard by the 
arbitrator, rather than the courts, pursuant to the separability doctrine of Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).  See WARE, supra note 
11, §§ 2.19-2.21. 
 33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981). 
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or “gross disparity in the values exchanged.”34  Procedural 
unconscionability deals with the process of contract formation, 
encompassing “not only the employment of sharp practices and the use 
of fine print and convoluted language, but a lack of understanding and an 
inequality of bargaining power.”35 
Most statements of the law of unconscionability now hold that both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability are required before courts 
will grant relief from a challenged term.  Judicial decisions have not 
consistently followed this principle, however, and some courts have 
suggested a vaguely mathematical metaphor in which a large amount of 
one type of unconscionability can make up for only a small amount of 
the other.36 
Many courts treat adhesion contracts, or at least those between parties of 
“unequal bargaining power,”37 as automatically procedurally 
unconscionable.38  Therefore, with respect to most adhesive arbitration 
 
 34. Id. § 208 cmt. c. 
 35. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (2d ed. 1990) see generally 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
 36. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability 
and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1993). 
 37. “[T]he concept [of unequal bargaining power] has proved so slippery and 
indefinable, so vague and nebulous, and so open to uncertainty that its utility for 
explaining any element of the bargaining relationship is doubtful.”  Daniel D. 
Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 193 (2005).  
“Modern American courts have largely failed to infuse the concept of inequality of 
bargaining [power] with legally coherent meaning.” Id. at 199. 
 38. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The [Agreement] is procedurally 
unconscionable because it is a contract of adhesion: a standard-form contract, 
drafted by the party with superior bargaining power, which relegates to the other 
party the option of either adhering to its terms without modification or rejecting the 
contract entirely.”) (citing Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 
(1997)); Lytle v. Citifinancial Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 658 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); 
Whitney v. Alltel Comm’cs, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Strand v. 
U.S. Bank Nat’l. Ass’n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 923 (N.D. 2005) (“all adhesion 
contracts will include the most common indicators of procedural 
unconscionability—disparity of bargaining power, lack of bargaining choice, a 
preprinted standard form contract, and a ‘take it or leave it’ transaction”).  But see, 
e.g., Novak v. Overture Serv. , Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2004) (“An 
‘agreement cannot be considered procedurally unconscionable, or a contract of 
adhesion, simply because it is a form contract.’”) (quoting Rosenfeld v. Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey, 108 F. Supp. 2d 156, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 
2000)). 
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agreements, the focus is entirely on substantive unconscionability.39 
 How should courts decide whether a particular arbitration 
agreement is substantively unconscionable?40  At one level, the question 
is unanswerable. 
To declare an arbitration clause, or any contract term, substantively 
unconscionable requires a substantive theory of fairness to distinguish 
conscionable from unconscionable terms.  “A substantive fairness 
theory assumes that a standard of value can be found by which the 
substance of any agreement can be objectively evaluated. Such a 
criterion has yet to be articulated and defended.”  In short, values are 
subjective and substantive unconscionability is in the eye of the 
beholder.41 
There is another level on which one can begin to give some content 
to the notion of substantive unconscionability, that is, “gross disparity in 
the values exchanged.”42  It is clear that a proper application of the 
unconscionability doctrine involves an assessment of the contract ex 
ante, rather than ex post.43  In other words, a court should assess the 
 
 39. A similar result through different analysis was reached in Brower v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572-74 (App. Div. 1998), which found no 
procedural unconscionability in a consumer form contract, but nevertheless found 
the contract unenforceable because “[w]hile . . . unconscionability is generally 
predicated on the presence of both the procedural and substantive elements, the 
substantive element alone may be sufficient to render the terms of the provision at 
issue unenforceable.”  Id. at 575. 
 40. With respect to substantive unconscionability, it is important to note that 
“[p]articular terms may be unconscionable whether or not the contract as a whole is 
unconscionable.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. e (1981). For 
that reason, one must distinguish whether an arbitration clause is unconscionable 
from whether the contract containing the arbitration clause is unconscionable.  “In 
some cases, there may be no objection to the arbitration clause, while the container 
contract is unconscionable because of its other terms. The unconscionability of 
those contracts has nothing to do with arbitration and, under the separability 
doctrine, is an issue for the arbitrator, not the court, to decide.”  Ware, supra note 
32, at 1018.  Here, the question is whether arbitration clause, in particular, is 
substantively unconscionable. 
 41. Ware, supra note 32, at 1018 (quoting Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory 
of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 284 (1986) (citation omitted)). 
 42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c (1981). 
 43. Id. § 208 (“If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the 
contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the 
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the 
application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.”); 
U.C.C. § 2-302(1)(2000) (“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
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“values exchanged” as of the time the contract was formed, rather than as 
of a later time, such as the time of a dispute. 
The ex ante approach should prevent courts from finding that the 
typical adhesion arbitration agreement is unconscionable.  In other 
words, courts should not hold an arbitration agreement unconscionable 
merely because the particular adhering party (e.g., consumer or 
employee), alleging unconscionability has a claim that is expected to 
result in a lower award if arbitrated than if litigated.44  As explained 
above, the deal that seems to be implicit in most adhesive arbitration 
agreements is that the consumer or employee receives a better price or 
wage and greater leverage on small-yet-meritorious claims in exchange 
for reduced leverage on claims that could lead to a big-dollar jury 
award.45  If there was nothing unconscionable about such a deal at the 
time it was formed—when there was uncertainty about whether there 
would be a dispute and, if so, what type of dispute—then the deal does 
not suddenly become unconscionable upon the occurrence of a dispute 
that could, if litigated, lead to a large jury award.  A proper application of 
the unconscionability doctrine would not consider just the reduction in 
the value of the claim the plaintiff turned out to have.  It would also 
consider the increase in the value of the other claims the plaintiff could 
have had and the better price or wage the plaintiff received due to the 
arbitration agreement.46  The combination of these factors should, except 
 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made . . . .”); 
id., cmt. 1 (“The basic test is whether . . . the clauses involved are so one-sided as to 
be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the 
contract.”). 
 44. It may be that most challenges to adhesive arbitration agreements are 
brought by plaintiffs whose lawyers have accurately concluded that the plaintiffs’ 
claims have a lower value in arbitration than in litigation.  If the empirical/anecdotal 
picture described in Section I.C. is accurate then the few adhering parties who are 
harmed by enforceable arbitration agreements are those few who have claims that 
could lead to a big-dollar jury award and those are (roughly) the few that can attract 
a lawyer to represent them.  These lawyers see that the value of their clients’ claims 
has been reduced by the arbitration agreement because the plaintiff is expected to 
receive a lower award in arbitration than would have been expected in litigation and 
this reduction in expectations reduces the settlement payment the plaintiff’s lawyer 
can negotiate. 
 45. See supra Section I.A.3. 
 46. Courts’ consideration of the price-reduction caused by contract terms that 
lower businesses costs has been endorsed by the Supreme Court in a ruling 
enforcing a forum-selection clause in an adhesion contract. See Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991) (“[I]t stands to reason that passengers 
who purchase tickets containing a forum clause . . . benefit in the form of reduced 
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perhaps in a few rare cases, show that there was no “gross disparity in 
the values exchanged”47 when the arbitration agreement was formed, and 
thus no unconscionability. 
B.  The “Effectively Vindicate” Doctrine 
1.  A Non-Contract-Law Ground 
While FAA § 2 requires parties to rely on contract law in 
challenging enforcement of arbitration agreements, this requirement is in 
tension with the requirements of some other federal statutes, which are 
less oriented toward contractual freedom than is the pro-contract FAA.  
These other statutes give a class of beneficiaries—such as consumers, 
employees, or investors—rights that cannot be contracted away prior to a 
dispute.48  In other words, these statutes create mandatory rules, rather 
than default rules.  Enforcement of a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate a 
claim arising out of these statutes is troubling because a flawed 
arbitration process or an erroneous decision by the arbitrator could 
deprive the statute’s beneficiary of the supposedly-mandatory rights.49  If 
 
fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it 
may be sued.”).  The Seventh Circuit has twice endorsed courts’ consideration of 
the price-reduction caused by adhesive arbitration agreements. See Metro East 
Center for Conditioning and Health v. Qwest Commc’ns, 294 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 
2002) (Easterbrook, J.). 
If arbitration offers benefits to Qwest and detriments to customers such as Metro 
East, these benefits are reflected in a lower cost of doing business that in 
competition are passed along to customers. There is lots of competition in interstate 
telecommunications service. Customers therefore are compensated through lower 
rates for any net loss they may experience in arbitration. They can’t accept the 
lower rates . . . while avoiding the means that made lower rates possible. 
Id. at 927 (emphasis in original).  Accord Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 
(7th Cir. 2002) (Manion, J.). 
 47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c (1981). 
 48. See e.g., infra Section II.B.2. 
 49. If a party argues that a court has made an error of law, an appellate court 
will engage in de novo review and reverse if it finds error.  By contrast, if a party 
argues that an arbitrator has made an error of law, a court will engage in very 
deferential review and thus likely confirm an arbitrator’s decision that rests on such 
an error. To put it another way, “error of law” is not a legally-recognized ground for 
vacating arbitration awards. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory 
Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999).  For the 
same point in the context of international arbitration, see Philip J. McConnaughay, 
The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness:  A “Second Look” at International 
Commercial Arbitration, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1999). 
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this occurs, then the arbitration agreement effectively contracted away 
the very rights that a statute supposedly put beyond the reach of a pre-
dispute contract.  Thus, there is a tension between the FAA, which 
requires enforcement of such agreements unless there is a contract-law 
ground for denying enforcement, and the statute which prohibits 
enforcement of such agreements in order to preserve the rights at issue 
for the statute’s beneficiaries. 
The Supreme Court has resolved this tension against the FAA by 
recognizing a non-contract-law ground for denying enforcement of 
agreements to arbitrate claims arising out of these federal statutes.  I call 
this the “effectively vindicate” ground.  The Supreme Court said: 
[W]e have recognized that federal statutory claims can be appropriately 
resolved through arbitration, and we have enforced agreements to 
arbitrate that involve such claims.  We have likewise rejected 
generalized attacks on arbitration that rest on suspicion of arbitration as 
a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law 
to would-be complainants. These cases demonstrate that even claims 
arising under a statute designed to further important social policies may 
be arbitrated because so long as the prospective litigant effectively may 
vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the 
statute serves its functions.50 
The Court went on to hold that arbitration agreements should not be 
enforced when enforcement would prevent the prospective litigant from 
“effectively . . . vindicate[ing] his or her statutory cause of action.”51 
2.  The “Effectively Vindicate” Doctrine and State Claims 
While courts can use the “effectively vindicate” ground with respect 
to claims arising out of federal statutes, the FAA precludes this ground 
with respect to claims arising out of state statutes.  Under FAA §2 and 
Casarotto, the only permissible grounds for denying enforcement to 
arbitration agreements are grounds “for the revocation of any contract.”52  
 
 50. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-90 (2000) 
(quotations omitted) (emphasis added).  The Court previously used the “effectively 
vindicate” phrase in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) 
(Age Discrimination in Employment Act), Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (Securities Exchange Act), and Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (Sherman Act). 
 51. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 90 (emphasis added). 
 52. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (emphasis added); see supra notes 29-31 and 
accompanying text. 
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The “effectively vindicate” ground is not such a ground.  So with respect 
to some federal claims there is tension between two federal statutes: the 
statute out of which the claim arises and the FAA.  While this tension can 
be resolved against the FAA in cases involving two federal statutes, “the 
FAA certainly does not yield to a state statute or state common law 
doctrine with which it is in tension.  That is because the United States 
Constitution makes federal law supreme over state law.”53  So the FAA 
trumps mandatory state law although the FAA, to some extent, yields to 
mandatory federal law under the “effectively vindicate” doctrine. 
Some state courts seem to get around this FAA preemption of 
mandatory state law by holding that an agreement is unconscionable if it 
prevents the plaintiff from “effectively vindicating” her rights under that 
statute.54  If this end-run around FAA preemption of state statutes is 
permissible then courts should also hold that an agreement is 
unconscionable if it prevents the plaintiff from “effectively vindicating” 
her rights under state common law.  There is no reason why claims 
arising under mandatory common law deserve less protection than 
 
 53. WARE, supra note 11, § 2.28(b); see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Green Tree 
Fin. Corp. of Ala. v. Wampler, 749 So.2d 409, 416 (Ala. 1999) (“Unlike Paladino, 
in which competing federal policies were in play, this present case arises under 
common-law principles governed solely by Alabama law and involves only one 
federal policy, that being a policy favoring arbitration.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Whitney v. Alltel Commc’ns, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2005). 
Whitney had allegedly been improperly billed a total of $24.64. . . . [T]he 
[arbitration] award could not possibly approach the amount that would have to be 
expended in arbitrating the action. Accordingly, the costs would be so prohibitively 
expensive as to preclude, for all practical purposes, an aggrieved party from 
seeking redress for a violation of the Merchandising Practices Act. Any of Alltel’s 
other customers wishing to challenge the eighty-eight cent charge would face the 
same economic hurdle. Yet because of the many customers affected, Alltel would 
be entitled to retain millions and millions of dollars from what were allegedly 
improper and deceptive charges. Moreover, since no single customer could 
undertake a case against Alltel, the company could continue its improper and 
deceptive charges ad infinitum since none of its customers would have a practical 
remedy to bring about a stop to the conduct. 
. . . This result would be unconscionable and in direct conflict with the legislature’s 
declared public policy as evidenced by the Merchandising Practices Act and similar 
statutes. 
Id. at 313-14.  This case involves an arbitration agreement that prohibits class action 
litigation and arbitration conducted on a classwide basis.  The enforceability of such 
agreements is discussed infra in Section III. 
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claims arising under mandatory statutory law.55 
3.  The Unknown Content of the “Effectively Vindicate” 
 Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has yet to flesh out the “effectively vindicate” 
doctrine.  The Court has not set forth the elements that must be shown by 
a party invoking the doctrine to defeat enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement.  Unlike the unconscionability doctrine, which developed 
outside arbitration, there is no non-arbitration body of case law to draw 
upon in developing the “effectively vindicate” doctrine.  So the 
“effectively vindicate” doctrine could evolve in any number of possible 
directions. 
One possibility is that there will be no significant difference 
between how courts apply the “effectively vindicate” doctrine and how 
they apply the unconscionability doctrine.  If this occurs, then courts 
should not find the typical adhesion arbitration agreement unenforceable 
under the “effectively vindicate” doctrine for the same reasons56 they 
should not find the typical adhesion arbitration agreement unenforceable 
under a proper (ex ante) application of the unconscionability doctrine.57 
 
 55. Ware, supra note 49, at 732-33. 
 56. Section II.A. 
 57. If the “effectively vindicate” doctrine becomes virtually identical to the 
unconscionability doctrine then the “effectively vindicate” doctrine is redundant and 
unnecessary so long as states maintain unconscionability doctrines strong enough to 
effectively vindicate federal statutory rights. 
  The unconscionability doctrine is a matter of state contract law so states can 
vary in what they find unconscionable.  Some states may have a broad 
unconscionability doctrine that aggressively regulates contract terms, while other 
states may have a narrow unconscionability doctrine or even none at all.  The same 
is true with respect to the unconscionability of arbitration agreements, even though 
arbitration agreements are governed by a federal statute, the FAA.  As noted above, 
the FAA incorporates state law on the defenses to contract enforcement, including 
unconscionability.  So an arbitration agreement that is unconscionable under one 
state’s law may not be unconscionable under another state’s law. 
  While this diversity is generally permitted under the FAA, if a state’s courts 
were to find that all adhesive arbitration agreements are unconscionable the state 
would have run afoul of the Supreme Court’s command that state courts may not 
“rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law 
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court 
to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot.” Doctor’s Associates, 517 U.S. at 
687-88 n.3 (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987)). But what if a 
state’s courts went to the other extreme and held that no adhesive arbitration 
agreements are unconscionable?  This would be within the state’s power to do, so 
2006] ADHESIVE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 273 
A more likely possibility, however, is that the “effectively vindicate” 
doctrine will incorporate an ex post perspective.  The Court’s statements 
of the “effectively vindicate” doctrine thus far seem to consider the 
effects of the arbitration agreement from an ex post perspective because 
the Court’s focus is on whether the “prospective litigant effectively may 
vindicate his or her statutory cause of action.”58  It is possible that courts 
will find that a typical adhesive arbitration agreement prevents effective 
vindication of a statutory right simply because the party asserting that 
right is expected to receive a lower award in arbitration than in litigation.  
This seems unlikely though, because of the difficulty (before the claim’s 
merits have been heard in any forum) of ascertaining the award expected 
in litigation and the award expected in arbitration. Proving what award is 
expected (by whom?) in each forum would be daunting without statistics 
on the levels of awards in comparable cases in arbitration and litigation.  
As noted above, nobody knows if the cases going to arbitration are 
comparable to the cases going to litigation. 59 
C.  Summary and Transition 
There are then, several uncertainties in the legal doctrine.  The 
unconscionability doctrine (especially its substantive component) 
remains notoriously subjective, despite courts working with the doctrine 
for generations now.  The “effectively vindicate” doctrine is so new and 
ill-defined that it could evolve in any number of directions.  And the 
relationship between the two doctrines remains an open question.  All 
this uncertainty is sure to complicate the law on adhesive arbitration 
agreements for some time. 
Despite all this uncertainty, it is clear that these two doctrines—
unconscionability and “effectively vindicate”—are the field on which the 
battle over adhesive arbitration agreements is being fought.  These are 
the doctrines—however flawed—courts use in assessing the 
enforceability of adhesive arbitration agreements.  So it is worth 
exploring how these doctrines apply to the issues that are now hotly 
contested in the courts: an arbitration agreement’s prohibition of class 
 
long as the plaintiff’s claims all arose out of state law.  But if the plaintiff sought to 
assert a federal claim, then the state’s extremely narrow application of the 
unconscionability doctrine would be preempted by the federal law that an 
arbitration agreement is unenforceable if it prevents the plaintiff from effectively 
vindicating her federal statutory rights. 
 58. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 59. See infra Section I.C. 
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actions (discussed in Section III) and the costs of pursuing a claim in 
arbitration (discussed in Section IV). 
III.  CLASS ACTIONS 
A.  Arbitration Agreements that Prohibit Class Actions 
It is possible to write an agreement that requires arbitration of all 
claims except for those that, if litigated, could be pursued as part of a 
class action.  I refer to such claims as “aggregatable” claims.  While it is 
possible to except aggregatable claims from the duty to arbitrate, 60 few 
adhesive arbitration agreements are written that way.  Many adhesive 
arbitration agreements simply require arbitration of all claims, thus 
implicitly requiring arbitration of aggregatable claims.61  Some adhesive 
arbitration agreements make this explicit by including language telling 
the adhering party that she is waiving her right to pursue class 
litigation.62 
If a court enforces an arbitration agreement that, implicitly or 
explicitly, prohibits class litigation then another question arises.  Will the 
arbitration be conducted on a classwide basis or will it be traditional, 
individual arbitration?  While there were very few instances of class 
arbitration before the Twenty-First Century,63 the procedure seems to 
have become more common in the last few years, perhaps due to the 
 
 60. Agreements to arbitrate under the rules of the securities exchanges 
effectively except aggregatable claims from the duty to arbitrate because those rules 
provide that class actions are not eligible for arbitration. See NYSE Rule 600(d)(i), 
2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2600 (2001); NASD Rule 10301(d)(1), NASD Manual 
(CCH) 7571 (2002). See, e.g., Nielsen v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc, 66 F3d 
145, 148-49 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding arbitration of class action prohibited by NASD 
Rules); Olde Discount Corp. v Hubbard, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1271 (D. Kan. 1998) 
(aff’d 172 F.3d 879 (10th cir. 1999) (same). 
 61. See, e.g., Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 448 (2003) 
(“All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this contract or 
the relationships which result from this contract . . . shall be resolved by binding 
arbitration . . .”) 
 62. See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., L.L.C., 400 F.3d 868, 
872 (11th Cir. 2005) (“YOU ARE WAIVING YOUR RIGHT TO SERVE AS A 
REPRESENTATIVE, AS A PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, OR IN ANY 
OTHER REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY, AND/OR TO PARTICIPATE AS A 
MEMBER OF A CLASS OF CLAIMANTS, IN ANY LAWSUIT FILED 
AGAINST US AND/OR RELATED THIRD PARTIES”). 
 63. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class 
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 38 (2000). 
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Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
Bazzle.64  In cases arising out of adhesion contracts, class arbitration may 
appear to many courts as an attractive compromise between plaintiffs 
asking for class litigation and defendants seeking to limit the plaintiffs to 
individual arbitration.65  But what if an adhesive arbitration agreement 
requires individual, rather than class, arbitration?  In other words, what if 
the agreement prohibits class adjudication in any forum?66 
 
 64. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).  Bazzle involved Green Tree’s form consumer loan 
contract, which contained an arbitration clause. Id. at 447.  Plaintiffs sued Green 
Tree in South Carolina state court and asked the court to certify a class action.  Id. at 
449.  Green Tree sought to stay the court proceedings and compel arbitration. Id.  
The trial court both (1) certified a class action and (2) entered an order compelling 
arbitration. Id.  Green Tree then selected an arbitrator with the plaintiffs’ consent 
and the arbitrator, administering the proceeding as a class arbitration, awarded the 
class $10,935,000 in statutory damages, along with attorney’s fees. Id.  The trial 
court confirmed the award, and Green Tree appealed claiming, among other things, 
that class arbitration was legally impermissible. Id.  On appeal, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court held that the contracts were silent with respect to class arbitration, 
that they consequently authorized class arbitration, and that arbitration had properly 
taken that form. Id. at 450.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider 
whether that holding is consistent with the FAA. Id. 
  While three dissenting justices thought the arbitration clause prohibited 
class arbitration, id. at 458-59, the Court agreed with the South Carolina Supreme 
Court that the clause was silent on whether class arbitration was permitted.  Id. at 
450-51.  Rather than affirming the South Carolina Supreme Court, however, the 
Court held that the arbitrator, rather than a court, should decide whether this silent 
contract should be interpreted to permit or prohibit class arbitration.  Id. at 451-52.  
Therefore, the Court remanded for further proceedings.  Id. at 454. 
 65. On the other hand, there are due process, doctrinal and practical concerns 
about class arbitration.  These concerns are well discussed in Carole J. Buckner, 
Due Process in Classwide Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185 (2006) ; Carole J. 
Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbitral Paradigm of Classwide Arbitration: Arbitral 
Power and Federal Preemption, 82 DEN. U. L. REV. 301 (2004). 
 66. This question is discussed in Kristen M. Blankley, Class Actions Behind 
Closed Doors? How Consumer Claims Can (and Should) Be Resolved by Class-
Action Arbitration, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 451 (2005); Myriam Gilles, 
Opting Out of Liability, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005); Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark 
J. Levin, Consensus or Conflict? Most (But Not All) Courts Enforce Express Class 
Action Waivers in Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 60 BUS. LAW. 775 (2005); 
Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1593 
(2005); Eric J. Mogilnicki & Kirk D. Jensen, Arbitration and Unconscionability, 19 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 761, 775-78 (2003); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jenson, 
Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice 
or Unconscionable Abuse?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/ Spring 2004, at 75, 
75- 76; Robert S. Safi, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Preserving the Class 
Mechanism Under State Law in the Era of Consumer Arbitration, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
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Many courts have enforced such agreements.67  When a court does 
so, it may reduce the value of all aggregatable claims to zero.68  That is, 
the claims are not worth pursuing except as part of a class because the 
process costs of pursuing them individually exceed the expected 
 
1715 (2005); Joshua S. Lipshutz, Note, The Court’s Implicit Roadmap: Charting the 
Prudent Course at the Juncture of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class 
Action Lawsuits, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1677 (2005); Jack Wilson, No-Class-Action 
Arbitration Clauses, State-Law Unconscionability, and the Federal Arbitration Act: 
A Case for Federal Judicial Restraint and Congressional Action, 23 QUINNIPIAC 
L.REV. 737 (2004); Lindsay R. Androski, Comment, A Contested Merger: The 
Intersection of Class Actions and Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 2003 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 631; Stephanie Smith, Comment, The Use of Mandatory Arbitration 
Clauses to Prevent Class Actions: A Problem for Plaintiffs and a Problem for 
Society, 2 J. AM. ARB. 129 (2003). 
 67. See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 
877-78 (11th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 373-74 (3d 
Cir. 2000); Livingston v. Associates Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003); 
Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002); Walther 
v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 750 (Md. 2005); Autonation USA Corp. v. 
Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 
790 A.2d 1249, 1260-61 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001); Gras v. Associates First Capital 
Corp., 786 A.2d 886, 892 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Med. Center Cars, Inc. 
v. Smith, 727 So.2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998) (stating that “to require class-wide arbitration 
would alter the agreements of the parties, whose arbitration agreements do not 
provide for class-wide arbitration”); Rains v. Found. Health Sys. Life & Health, 23 
P.3d 1249, 1253 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that “arbitration clauses are not 
unenforceable simply because they might render a class action unavailable”); Rosen 
v. SCIL, LLC, 799 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (finding arbitration clause 
“enforceable despite its prohibition on class actions”); Ranieri v. Bell Atlantic 
Mobile, 759 N.Y.S.2d 448 (2003) (stating that “given the strong public policy 
favoring arbitration . . . and the absence of a commensurate policy favoring class 
actions, we are in accord with authorities holding that a contractual proscription 
against class actions . . . is neither unconscionable nor violative of public policy”) 
(citations omitted); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 
2005). 
 68. Assuming that the per-claim “process costs” (the time and legal fees spent 
on pleadings, discovery, motions, trial or hearing, and appeal) of pursuing and 
defending claims in class adjudication and individual arbitration are identical, 
enforcement of the arbitration agreement reduces the value of claims expected to 
yield a higher per-claim award in class adjudication than in individual arbitration.  
Moreover, “class actions may provide significant economies of scale,” Christopher 
R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 753 (2001), 
so that the per-claim process costs of pursuing claims in class adjudication are lower 
than in individual arbitration.  If this is true, then enforcing the arbitration 
agreement may also reduce the value of some claims expected to yield a lower per-
claim award in class adjudication than in individual arbitration. 
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recovery.  Assuming that enforcement of the arbitration agreement 
reduces the value of all aggregatable claims held by the plaintiff(s) 
challenging enforceability to zero, does this make the agreement 
unenforceable under either the unconscionability or “effectively 
vindicate” doctrines?  Consider unconscionability first. 
B.  The Unconscionability Doctrine 
As emphasized above, a proper application of the unconscionability 
doctrine involves an assessment of the contract ex ante, rather than ex 
post.69  In other words, a court should assess the “values exchanged” as 
of the time the contract was formed, rather than as of a later time, such as 
the time of a dispute.  The ex ante approach should prevent courts from 
finding that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable merely because 
its enforcement would reduce the value of all aggregatable claims and 
reduce to zero the value of the particular aggregatable claim held by the 
plaintiff(s) challenging enforceability.  As explained above, the deal that 
seems to be implicit in most adhesive arbitration agreements is that the 
consumer or employee receives a better price or wage and greater 
leverage on small-yet-meritorious claims in exchange for reduced 
leverage on claims that could lead to a big-dollar jury award.70  If the 
agreement prohibits class adjudication, then an additional term of this 
implicit deal is “reduced leverage on aggregatable claims.”  But this 
additional term generates even more cost savings to the business than 
would have been achieved by an arbitration agreement without a 
prohibition on class adjudication,71 and some or all of these additional 
 
 69. See supra Section II.A. 
 70. See supra Section I.A.3. 
 71. Prohibiting class adjudication may generate cost-savings passed on to 
adhering parties that exceed the benefits class actions would have conferred on 
adhering parties.  As Professor Chris Drahozal explains, 
[C]lass actions too often may not achieve their theoretical benefits. One 
problem is conflicts of interest within the class. Even more problematic is 
the now well-recognized conflict of interest between class members and 
the attorneys representing the class. Precisely because class members 
frequently have small claims that do not give them much incentive to 
participate actively in the case, class actions tend to be run by, and for the 
benefit of, the plaintiffs’ attorneys. Settlements can be too low and come 
too early, and legal fees can be too high. Additionally, the prospect of 
immense class liability may create an “intense pressure to settle” on 
defendants, resulting in what some have called “blackmail settlements.” In 
either case, the parties, on net, may be better off with no class relief, with 
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savings are passed on to adhering parties (e.g., consumer and employees) 
through the process explained above.72  The deal implicit in an 
arbitration agreement with a prohibition on class adjudication becomes: 
an even better price or wage than would have been achieved by an 
arbitration agreement without such a prohibition, plus greater leverage 
on non-aggregatable, small-yet-meritorious claims in exchange for 
reduced leverage on claims that could lead to a big-dollar jury award and 
on aggregatable claims. 
If there were nothing unconscionable about such a deal at the time it 
was formed—when there was uncertainty about whether there would be 
a dispute and, if so, what type of dispute—then the deal does not 
suddenly become unconscionable upon the occurrence of a dispute that 
produces aggregatable claims.  A proper application of the 
unconscionability doctrine would not consider just the reduction in the 
value of the aggregatable claim the plaintiffs turned out to have.  It 
would also consider the increase in the value of the other claims the 
plaintiffs could have had and the better price or wage the plaintiffs 
received due to both the arbitration agreement and its prohibition on 
class adjudication.73  The combination of these factors should, except 
perhaps in a few rare cases, show that there was no “gross disparity in 
the values exchanged”74 when the arbitration agreement was formed and 
thus no unconscionabity. 
Unfortunately, many courts seem to focus on the reduction (or 
elimination) in the value of the aggregatable claim the plaintiffs turned 
out to have without considering the increase in the value of the other 
claims the plaintiffs could have had and the better price or wage the 
plaintiff received due to both the arbitration agreement and its 
prohibition on class adjudication.  For example, the Alabama Supreme 
Court said: 
This arbitration agreement is unconscionable because it is a contract of 
adhesion that restricts the Leonards to a forum where the expense of 
 
individuals giving up some deterrence benefits in exchange for reduced 
dispute-resolution costs (including attorneys’ fees) or reduced 
overdeterrence. 
Drahozal, supra note 68, at 741 & 754 (citations omitted). 
 72. See supra Section I.A. 
 73. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991); Metro 
East Ctr. for Conditioning and Health v. Qwest Commc’n, 294 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 
2002), discussed supra note 47. 
 74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c (1981). 
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pursuing their claim far exceeds the amount in controversy. The 
arbitration agreement achieves this result by foreclosing the Leonards 
from an attempt to seek practical redress through a class action and 
restricting them to a disproportionately expensive individual 
arbitration.75 
The California Supreme Court recently issued a similar opinion.76  Such 
courts are taking the ex post perspective of assessing unconscionability 
as of the time of the dispute, which is when the plaintiffs seeking a class 
adjudication would be better off with the right to a class adjudication 
than they would be lacking that right.  By contrast, and to reiterate, a 
proper application of the unconscionability doctrine involves an 
assessment of the contract ex ante; a court should assess the “values 
exchanged” as of the time the contract was formed. 
 
 75. Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., 854 So. 2d 529, 539 (Ala. 2003).  “Several 
courts confronting this issue have been favorably disposed to the view that an 
arbitration clause that defeats the prospects of class-action treatment in a setting 
where the practical effect affords the defendant immunity is unconscionable.” Id. at 
536 (citing Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 842 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999); Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1207 
(Cal.1982), rev’d in part and appeal dismissed in part on other grounds, Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.1 (1984); Rollins, Inc. v. Foster, 991 F. Supp. 1426, 1437 
(M.D. Ala. 1998); Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 
(1993); Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E. 2d 859, 866-67 (Ohio 1998); State of 
West Virginia ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002); and Ting v. 
AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 938-39 (N.D. Cal. 2002) aff’d in part and rev’d in 
part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
  Other recent cases finding prohibitions on class adjudication unconscionable 
include: Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003); Ingle v. Circuit City 
Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004), 
enforced, 408 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2005); Whitney v. Alltel Commc’n, Inc., 173 
S.W.3d 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 828 N.E.2d 
812, 820 (Ill. App. 2005) (appeal allowed, 839 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. 2005). 
 76. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76 (Cal. 2005). 
We do not hold that all class action waivers are necessarily unconscionable. But 
when the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which 
disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of 
damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power 
has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money, then, at least to the extent the obligation at issue 
is governed by California law, the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the 
party “from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or 
property of another.” (CIV. CODE, § 1668.) Under these circumstances, such 
waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced. 
 Id. at 87. 
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C.  The “Effectively Vindicate” Doctrine 
As explained above, the Supreme Court has held that courts should 
not enforce agreements to arbitrate when doing so would prevent the 
prospective litigant from “effectively . . . vindicate[ing] his or her 
[federal] statutory cause of action.”77 
This “effectively vindicate” doctrine can be compared to the 
unconscionability doctrine in the context of arbitration agreements that 
prohibit class adjudication.  Enforcing such an arbitration agreement, as 
explained above, may reduce the value of all aggregatable claims and 
may reduce the value of some of them to zero.78 
This might not often prevent enforceability under the “effectively 
vindicate” doctrine if courts apply that doctrine in the same (ex ante) 
manner that courts properly apply the unconscionability doctrine.79  
However, many courts have taken an ex post perspective in applying the 
unconscionability doctrine to adhesive arbitration agreements that 
prohibit class adjudication,80 and it seems even more likely that courts 
will take an ex post perspective in applying the “effectively vindicate” 
doctrine because doing so finds support in the Supreme Court’s 
statements of that doctrine.81  Thus it seems likely that courts will bar 
enforcement of some adhesive arbitration agreements prohibiting class 
adjudication on the ground that that prohibition prevents some 
prospective litigants from “effectively vindicating” their rights by 
reducing or eliminating the value of some aggregatable claims. 
How should a court decide whether a prohibition on class 
adjudication prevents a prospective litigant, typically the plaintiff, from 
effectively vindicating her rights?  Basically, the court must decide 
whether the plaintiff has access to justice.  Is her individual claim large 
enough to attract a lawyer, or is there a fee-shifting statute that is likely to 
do so?  If not, does the arbitration agreement permit her to bring the 
claim in her local small claims court so that she can have access to 
justice even without hiring a lawyer?  Or is the arbitration process as 
simple and informal as a small claims court so the plaintiff can pursue 
her individual claim in arbitration without a lawyer?  If not, is there an 
administrative agency that will pursue the claim on her behalf and 
 
 77. See supra Section II.B.1 at note 54 (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama 
v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000). 
 78. See supra Section III.A. 
 79. See supra Section III.B. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See supra Section II.B. 
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provide her with the sort of remedy she would have received in class 
litigation?  An affirmative answer to any of these questions should defeat 
an “effectively-vindicate” challenge to a prohibition on class 
adjudication. 
IV.  ARBITRATION COSTS 
A.  The Supreme Court Gets It Right 
1. Randolph 
In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,82 the Supreme 
Court held that the costs of pursuing a claim in arbitration can be a basis 
for denying enforcement to an arbitration agreement.  The plaintiff in 
Randolph bought a mobile home with financing provided by the 
defendant.83  The plaintiff brought a class action in federal court 
asserting violations of the Truth in Lending Act.84  The defendant moved 
to compel arbitration based on its arbitration agreement with the 
plaintiff.85 
The arbitration agreement in Randolph was unusual because it did 
not say that arbitration would be conducted under the rules of a particular 
arbitration organization,86 such as the American Arbitration Association 
or the National Arbitration Forum.  Those organizations’ rules specify, 
among other things, the fees parties must pay the organization to file a 
case in arbitration.87  By not incorporating the rules of any particular 
arbitration organization into the arbitration agreement, the agreement in 
Randolph was silent on the costs of arbitration.  To compound this 
deficiency, the agreement was also silent on who would pay the costs.88  
By contrast, many other arbitration agreements say something about who 
will pay, such as that the costs of arbitration shall be shared equally by 
the parties,89 or that the losing party shall pay all costs,90 or that the 
 
 82. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 83. Id. at 82. 
 84. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2000). 
 85. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 83. 
 86. Id. at 90 n.6. 
 87. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee 
Contracts, VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 88. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 90-91. 
 89. See, e.g., Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 785 n.11 (Wash. 2004); 
O’Quin v. Verizon Wireless L.P., 256 F. Supp. 2d 512, 518 (M.D. La. 2003); 
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adhering party shall pay up to a certain dollar amount and the business 
shall pay the rest.91 
The District Court in Randolph granted the defendant’s motion to 
compel arbitration but the Eleventh Circuit, relying on the “effectively 
vindicate” doctrine, reversed.92  It “conclud[ed] that the arbitration clause 
in this case is unenforceable, because it fails to provide the minimum 
guarantees required to ensure that Randolph’s ability to vindicate her 
statutory rights will not be undone by steep filing fees, steep arbitrators’ 
fees, or other high costs of arbitration.”93 
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, holding that the 
record “provide[s] no basis on which to ascertain the actual costs and 
fees to which [Randolph] would be subject in arbitration.”94  The Court 
said that “[t]he ‘risk’ that Randolph will be saddled with prohibitive costs 
is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration 
agreement.”95  Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that “[i]t may well 
be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant 
such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights 
in the arbitral forum.”96 The Court placed the burden of proof on future 
parties asserting cost-based challenges to arbitration agreements.97 
2.  The Unconscionability and “Effectively Vindicate” Doctrines 
 Compared 
The Supreme Court got it right in Randolph.  “[L]arge arbitration 
costs” could rise to the level that would justify a court in denying 
enforcement to an arbitration agreement under either the 
unconscionability doctrine or the “effectively vindicate” doctrine.  
Consider the unconscionability doctrine first. 
 
Gambardella v. Pentec, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 237, 244 n.5 (D. Conn. 2002). 
 90. See, e.g., Bellevue Drug Co. v. Advance PCS, 333 F. Supp. 2d 318, 330-31 
(E.D. Pa. 2004); Scovill v. WSYX/ABC, Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 
2d 955, 958-59 (S.D. Ohio 2004); Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 
260 (3rd Cir. 2003). 
 91. See, e.g., Rivera v. Thomas, 316 F. Supp. 2d 256, 260-61 (D. Md. 2004); 
DeGrof v. Mascotech Forming Techs.-Fort Wayne, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 896, 911 
(N.D. Ind. 2001). 
 92. 178 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 93. Id. at 1158. 
 94. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 n.6 (2000). 
 95. Id. at 91. 
 96. Id. at 90. 
 97. Id. at 92. 
2006] ADHESIVE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 283 
If the plaintiffs’ costs of pursuing claims under a particular 
arbitration agreement exceed the costs of pursuing them in litigation 
then, all other things being equal, enforcing the arbitration agreement 
lowers the value of those plaintiffs’ claims.  While an arbitration 
agreement should not be held unconscionable merely because it reduces 
the value of a particular plaintiff’s claim,98 high arbitration costs likely 
apply to all claims by all plaintiffs who are bound by the adhesive 
arbitration agreement at issue.99  Thus high arbitration costs change the 
deal that seems to be implicit in most adhesive arbitration agreements 
from one that gives the consumer or employee a better price or wage and 
greater leverage on small-yet-meritorious claims in exchange for reduced 
leverage on claims that could lead to a big-dollar jury award,100 to a deal 
that reduces the consumer/employee’s leverage on all claims.  But this 
reduced leverage generates even more cost savings to the business than 
would have been achieved by an arbitration agreement that did not 
require a high-cost arbitration process,101 and some or all of these 
additional savings are passed on to adhering parties (e.g., consumers and 
employees) through the process explained above.102  So the deal implicit 
in an arbitration agreement with such a requirement becomes: an even 
better price or wage than would have been achieved by an arbitration 
agreement that did not require a high-cost arbitration process, in 
exchange for reduced leverage on all claims. 
If there were nothing unconscionable about such a deal at the time it 
was formed—when there was uncertainty about whether there would be 
a dispute—then the deal does not suddenly become unconscionable upon 
the occurrence of a dispute.103  A proper application of the 
unconscionability doctrine would not consider just the reduction in the 
 
 98. See supra Section II.A. 
 99. Or at least all similarly-sized claims by all plaintiffs who are bound by the 
adhesive arbitration agreement at issue.  Arbitration fees often depend on the size of 
the claims asserted.  See, e.g., Fee Schedule, AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules. 
 100. See supra Section I.A.3. 
 101. These savings are the result of some claims against the business being 
deterred by the high-cost process. 
 102. See supra Section I.A. 
 103. For an all-too-rare case taking the ex ante approach in applying the 
unconscionability doctrine to arbitration fees, see Pro Tech Indus., Inc. v. URS 
Corp., 377 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Under Texas law, we only consider the 
circumstances at contract formation to determine if a contract is unconscionable, 
rendering Pro Tech’s current inability to afford the costs of arbitration irrelevant to 
the conscionabilty determination.”). 
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value of the plaintiff’s actual and possible claims.  It would also consider 
the better price or wage the plaintiffs received due to both the arbitration 
agreement and its requirement of a high-cost arbitration process.104  The 
combination of these factors should—in some, but not all, cases of high-
cost arbitration—show that there was no “gross disparity in the values 
exchanged”105 when the arbitration agreement was formed and thus no 
unconscionability. 
High arbitration costs would be analyzed similarly under the 
“effectively vindicate” doctrine if courts take an ex ante perspective in 
applying that doctrine.  Courts have, however, generally taken an ex post 
perspective in applying the “effectively vindicate” doctrine to cases of 
allegedly high arbitration costs.106  Under the ex post approach, courts 
should not enforce adhesive arbitration agreements that impose 
significantly higher costs of pursuing the claim than would be imposed in 
litigation of that claim because significantly higher costs would prevent 
the prospective litigant from “effectively . . . vindicate[ing] [his or her] 
statutory cause of action.”107 
3.  Summary and Transition 
To recap, the Court in Randolph was right to hold that “large 
arbitration costs” could rise to the level that would justify a court in 
denying enforcement to an arbitration agreement.  The Court was also 
right to put the burden of proof on the party seeking to show a defense to 
the enforcement of a contract.  Unfortunately, the Court said nothing 
about what the party seeking to avoid enforcement must show to meet 
this burden.108  Lacking guidance from the Supreme Court on this 
question, most lower courts have gone badly astray. 
 
 104. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991), and 
Metro East Ctr. for Conditioning and Health v. Qwest Commn’s, 294 F.3d 924 (7th 
Cir. 2002), discussed supra note 46. 
 105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c (1981). 
 106. See Section IV.B. 
 107. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (emphasis 
added). 
 108. Id. at 92 (“How detailed the showing of prohibitive expense must be before 
the party seeking arbitration must come forward with contrary evidence is a matter 
we need not discuss; for in this case neither during discovery nor when the case was 
presented on the merits was there any timely showing at all on the point.”). 
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B.  Lower Courts Get It Wrong 
1.  The Fundamental Error: Looking at Forum Fees in Isolation 
The fundamental error of most lower courts, before and after 
Randolph, is that they have looked at one cost of arbitration in isolation, 
rather than considering the total costs of arbitration.  The one cost of 
arbitration getting much more attention from lower courts than it 
deserves is the forum fee, the cost of paying the arbitrator and the 
arbitration organization.  The forum fees of arbitration tend to be higher 
than the forum fees of courts.  This is to be expected because courts are 
subsidized by the taxpayer and do not need parties in litigation to pay the 
judge or jury.  By contrast, parties to arbitration must pay the arbitrator’s 
fee, as well as the administrative costs of the arbitration organization.  
When the enforceability of an arbitration agreement is challenged based 
on allegedly high arbitration costs, most lower courts have stacked the 
deck against arbitration by myopically focusing on forum fees.  Instead, 
courts should consider whether “large arbitration costs”109 as a whole 
have, in a particular case, risen to the level that justifies denying 
enforcement of the arbitration agreement.  Rather than looking at forum 
fees in isolation, courts should look at the plaintiff’s total cost of 
pursuing the claim in arbitration as compared to litigation. 
Perhaps the case most responsible for the prevalence of courts 
looking at forum fees in isolation was Cole v. Burns International 
Security Services,110 an influential D.C. Circuit decision decided a few 
years before Randolph.  In the next few years leading up to Randolph, 
other federal circuits and the California Supreme Court followed Cole’s 
mistake of considering only forum fees rather than arbitration costs as a 
whole.111  By contrast, the First Circuit seemed to realize that what 
 
 109. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 90. 
 110. 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[I]f an employee like Cole is 
required to pay arbitrators’ fees ranging from $500 to $1,000 per day or more. . . in 
addition to administrative and attorney’s fees, is it likely that he will be able to 
pursue his statutory claims?  We think not.”) (citation and footnote omitted).  Cole 
has been narrowed by LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 246 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (employee may be charged reasonable administrative expenses, but not filing 
fees or arbitrator fees), and Brown v. Wheat First Sec., Inc., 257 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (Cole does not apply to common law claims). 
 111. Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Mgmt. of Col., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234 
(10th Cir. 1999) (“Assuming Mr. Shankle’s arbitration would have lasted an 
average length of time, he would have had to pay an arbitrator between $1,875 and 
$5,000 to resolve his claims.  Mr. Shankle could not afford such a fee, and it is 
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matters is the total cost of pursuing a claim and observed that “arbitration 
is often far more affordable to plaintiffs and defendants alike than is 
pursuing a claim in court.”112 
Shortly after Randolph, the Fourth Circuit improved upon the First 
Circuit in recognizing that forum fees should not be considered in 
isolation.  In Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc.,113 the 
Fourth Circuit held: 
Although the Cole court framed its concern with fee-splitting partially 
in terms of the fact that arbitrators’ fees are “unlike anything that [a 
claimant] would have to pay to pursue his statutory claims in court” 
because a claimant normally “would be free to pursue his claims in 
court without having to pay for the services of a judge,” Cole, 105 F.3d 
at 1484-85, we believe that the proper inquiry under Gilmer is not 
where the money goes but rather the amount of money that ultimately 
will be paid by the claimant.  Indeed, we fail to see how a claimant 
could be deterred from pursuing his statutory rights in arbitration 
simply by the fact that his fees would be paid to the arbitrator where the 
overall cost of arbitration is otherwise equal to or less than the cost of 
litigation in court.114 
 
unlikely other similarly situated employees could either.”) (citation omitted); 
Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(“Because Avnet makes no promises to pay for an arbitrator, employees may be 
liable for at least half the hefty cost of an arbitration and must, according to the 
American Arbitration Association rules the clause explicitly adopts, pay steep filing 
fees (in this case $2000).”); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 99 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 765 (Cal. 2000) (“[W]hen an employer imposes mandatory 
arbitration as a condition of employment, the arbitration agreement or arbitration 
process cannot generally require the employee to bear any type of expense that the 
employee would not be required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in 
court.”).  The California Supreme Court recently confined Armendariz in Boghos v. 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 787, 796 (Cal. 2005). 
 112. Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 16 
(1st Cir.1999); see also Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 366 
(7th Cir. 1999). 
 113. 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 114. Id. at 556.  See also id. n.5  (“parties to litigation in court often face costs 
that are not typically found in arbitration, such as the cost of longer proceedings and 
more complicated appeals on the merits”).  At least one court finding an arbitration 
agreement unenforceable  recognized that forum costs should not be considered in 
isolation. See Whitney v. Alltel Commc’n, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2005). 
[T]he Florida court spent all of three sentences rejecting the plaintiffs claim 
that the costs of arbitration were too prohibitive to vindicate his claim 
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Unfortunately, despite this point in Bradford, many courts continue 
to make the mistake of divorcing forum fees from arbitration costs as a 
whole.115 
As noted above, rather than looking at forum fees in isolation, courts 
should look at them as part of the plaintiff’s total cost of pursuing the 
claim.  The plaintiff’s total cost includes fees charged by the plaintiff’s 
lawyer and expert witnesses, the time the plaintiff devotes to the case, 
and the cost of delay in receiving a remedy.  A costs-based challenge to 
an arbitration agreement (under either the unconscionability or 
“effectively vindicate” doctrine) should fail unless the total cost the 
plaintiff faces in arbitration significantly exceeds the total cost the 
plaintiff would face in litigation. 
This is not likely to be common.  More likely, the total cost the 
plaintiff faces in arbitration will be lower than the total cost the plaintiff 
would face in litigation.  As noted above, the empirical evidence 
indicates that there are process-cost savings derived from arbitration.116  
And this stands to reason when one compares the procedural rules of 
arbitration with those of litigation.  When compared with litigation, most 
arbitration proceedings streamline the entire process:  pleadings, 
discovery, motion practice, trial or hearing, and appeal.117  This 
streamlined process results in less lawyer time spent on a case and thus 
lower legal fees.  The savings of time and money produced by 
 
based on a finding that the evidence did not establish that the plaintiff 
would incur prohibitive costs. In so doing, the Florida court focused 
entirely on the filing fees and hearing fees for arbitration and the fact that 
the contract provided for reimbursement of filing and hearing fees to the 
extent they exceeded what court costs would have been if the claim had 
been resolved in state court; the court did not consider the issue of 
attorneys fees and other costs. 
Id. at 313 (discussing Hughes v. Alltel Corp., No. 03 Civ. 127 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 
2004)). 
 115. See, e.g., Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 2004); Cooper v. 
MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2004); Alexander v. Anthony Int’l., L.P., 341 
F.3d 256, 269 (3d Cir. 2003); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th 
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004), enforced, 408 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 
2005) (applying Armendariz); Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l., 324 F.3d 212, 217 (3d 
Cir. 2003); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646(6th Cir. 2003). 
 116. See supra Section I.C. 
 117. See the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with the Commercial Arbitration 
Rules of the American Arbitration Association.  As noted above, empirical studies 
confirm that reduced process costs are a significant source of the cost-savings 
businesses derive from arbitration.  See Ware, supra note 9, at 753-55. 
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streamlined discovery alone may more than offset the higher forum fees 
in arbitration.  Also, the time between the commencement of a case and 
its disposition is generally lower in arbitration than litigation.118  This 
means plaintiffs get their recoveries sooner, a pro-plaintiff feature of 
arbitration to the extent pre- or post-judgment interest rates fall below the 
relevant time value of money.119 
2.  The Error of Treating Contingent-Fee Cases Differently 
One might object that the previous two paragraphs wrongly assume 
that the typical consumer or employee plaintiff pays her lawyer by the 
hour and pays—out of her own pocket—the other costs of litigation, 
such as court fees, expert witness fees, and the like.  In fact, many 
consumer and employee plaintiffs pay their lawyers through a contingent 
fee, and the plaintiff’s lawyer advances the other costs of litigation with 
the client’s agreement that these advances will be repaid first out of any 
settlement or judgment proceeds.120  Under such an arrangement, does it 
make sense to say that arbitration’s streamlined process results in less 
lawyer time spent on a case and thus lower legal fees?  The Sixth Circuit 
thinks not.  In Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,121 it said: 
In many, if not most, cases, employees (and former employees) 
bringing discrimination claims will be represented by attorneys on a 
contingency-fee basis. Thus, many litigants will face minimal costs in 
the judicial forum, as the attorney will cover most of the fees of 
litigation and advance the expenses incurred in discovery. Thus, in 
many cases it might be concluded that, considering the costs incurred 
by the employee litigant, there is little or no difference between the 
expenses of the judicial and arbitral fora—with one important 
exception. In the arbitral forum, the litigant faces an additional 
expense—the arbitrator’s fee and costs—which are never incurred in 
 
 118. See, e.g., David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing 
the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1572-73 (2005). 
 119. See, e.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(Posner, J.) (stating that “pre- and post-judgment interest rates are frequently below 
market levels when the risk of nonpayment is taken into account”). 
 120. See infra note 133 (quoting Morrison). The Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct permit lawyers to pay the expenses of litigation only for indigent clients.  
But, no matter who the client, “a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of 
litigation the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter.” 
MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.8(e)(1999). 
 121. 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
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the judicial forum.122 
This Article argues that, rather than looking at forum fees in 
isolation, courts should look at the plaintiff’s total cost of pursuing the 
claim.  The quote from Morrison suggests that this is a false distinction 
with respect to contingent-fee plaintiffs because, for such plaintiffs, the 
forum fees are the plaintiff’s total cost of pursuing the claim. 
What Morrison misses, however, is that contingent-fee agreements 
can be written in a variety of ways.  They can be written to require the 
lawyer to advance discovery expenses, but they can also be written to 
require the plaintiff to pay discovery expenses.  They can be written to 
require the lawyer to advance the forum fees of court, but they can also 
be written to require the plaintiff to pay the forum fees of court.  They 
can be written to require the lawyer to advance the forum fees of 
arbitration, but they can also be written to require the plaintiff to pay the 
forum fees of arbitration. 
As the previous paragraph shows, the forum fees of arbitration are 
no different from the forum fees of court (or from discovery expenses) 
with respect to whether the contingent-fee plaintiff or her lawyer will pay 
them.  As Professor Drahozal explains: 
On the face of it, there is no reason to expect contingent fee contracts to 
treat arbitration costs any differently than they treat other litigation 
expenses.  One would expect lawyers to advance arbitration costs for 
their clients, just like any other litigation expense—if the claim is 
economically viable based on the expected award and the expected 
total costs of arbitration. 
Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggest that this is in fact the case. . . . 
Moreover, if the practice [of contingent-fee lawyers advancing 
arbitration forum fees] is not common now, it may be due to cases like 
the Sixth Circuit’s Morrison decision.  Cases invalidating arbitration 
agreements on cost grounds provide a strong disincentive for lawyers to 
finance arbitration costs, because if the lawyers do so, they may deprive 
their clients of a possible ground for invalidating the arbitration 
agreement in court. 
At bottom, Public Citizen and the Morrison court have it exactly 
backwards.  Arbitration costs do not “severely restrict[], or eliminate[], 
the advantage a consumer has under the contingency fee system.”  
 
 122. Id. at 664. 
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Instead, the contingent fee system provides a mechanism for 
overcoming possible liquidity and risk aversion constraints due to 
arbitration costs. 
. . . 
Morrison reasoned that contingent fee contracts enable claimants to 
avoid most if not all upfront costs in litigation, but that in arbitration 
claimants must pay arbitration costs upfront - regardless of whether 
they have a contingent fee contract with their attorney.  That view 
incorrectly treats arbitration costs as somehow different from other 
litigation expenses, when there is every reason to believe that attorneys 
may be willing to advance arbitration costs the same way they are 
willing to advance other costs.  This fundamental misunderstanding 
suggest that the Sixth Circuit should revisit its approach to resolving 
cost-based challenges to arbitration agreements.123 
In sum, Morrison’s distinction between the forum costs of 
arbitration (which Morrison believes plaintiffs must pay) and the forum 
costs of court and discovery (which Morrison believes the plaintiff’s 
lawyer will pay) is misguided.  All these costs should be treated the same 
in a court’s analysis because all these costs could be advanced by the 
plaintiff’s lawyer or borne directly by the plaintiff.  Whether the 
agreement a particular plaintiff happens to have with her lawyer requires 
the lawyer to advance some or all of these costs should not matter to a 
court assessing the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.  To the 
extent courts do make it matter, these courts counter-productively 
“provide[] a strong incentive for strategic contracting between attorneys 
and their clients.  Attorneys would only agree to advance arbitration costs 
for clients when they did not intend to challenge the arbitration 
agreement in court.”124 
In addition to this pragmatic concern, there is a more basic reason 
why all costs should be treated the same in a court’s analysis regardless 
of whether a particular plaintiff’s agreement happens to require her 
lawyer to advance some costs.  This basic reason is that costs borne by 
the plaintiff’s lawyer are passed on to that lawyer’s clients, the plaintiffs.  
Representing plaintiffs is a business and, as emphasized above, whatever 
affects the costs to businesses tends over time to affect the prices to 
 
 123. Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts 
VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 124. Id. 
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consumers.125  Here, the consumers are plaintiffs who consume the 
services provided by plaintiffs’ lawyers. 
If, for example, there is an increase in the discovery costs plaintiffs’ 
lawyers incur, for things like traveling to depositions and paying expert 
witnesses, then plaintiffs’ lawyers will pass on some or all of these cost-
increases to their customers in the form of higher prices.  This price-
increase could come in the form of (1) a higher percentage of the 
settlement or judgment proceeds, or (2) an unwillingness to take cases 
that the lawyer would have previously accepted.  To some extent, the 
contingent-fee lawyer is an insurer, spreading risk among her clients.  
Part of the insurance premium each client pays (the percentage of the 
judgment or settlement) covers the “loss” of discovery costs spent on 
cases that produce no judgment or settlement.126  An increase in the 
losses insurers must pay tends to put upward pressure on premiums. 
In sum, costs to plaintiffs’ lawyers are costs to plaintiffs.  So a 
comparison of the total costs the plaintiff faces in arbitration and 
litigation should include the costs her lawyer has agreed to advance.  A 
court assessing a costs-based challenge to an arbitration agreement 
should ignore the agreement between the plaintiff and her lawyer.  The 
court should compare the total costs of pursuing the claim in arbitration 
and litigation, regardless of who (plaintiff or her lawyer) is initially 
paying those costs.  A costs-based challenge to an arbitration agreement 
(under either the unconscionability or “effectively vindicate” doctrine) 
should fail unless the total costs of pursuing a claim in arbitration 
significantly exceed the total costs of pursuing it in litigation.127 
As noted before the discussion of contingent fees,128 this is not 
likely to be common.  More likely, the total cost the plaintiff and her 
lawyer face in arbitration will be lower than the total cost they face in 
litigation.129  The streamlined process of arbitration results in less lawyer 
 
 125. See supra Section I.A.1. 
 126. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Legal-Process Constraints on the Regulation of 
Lawyers’ Contingent Fee Contracts, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376 (1998) (citing 
four functions of contingent fee contracts: (1) expanding access to justice by 
enabling claimants to finance litigation; (2) providing a source of financial credit; 
(3) avoiding agency costs due to shirking by lawyers; and (4) “offer[ing] clients a 
form of legal expense insurance”). 
 127. See Section IV.A.2. for an application of the unconscionability and 
“effectively vindicate” doctrines in the context of a costs-based challenge to an 
arbitration agreement. 
 128. See supra Section IV.B.1. 
 129. Id. 
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time spent on a case130 and, for contingent-fee lawyers, time is money 
because time spent on one case is time that cannot be spent on another 
case.  If arbitration’s streamlined process allows a reduction in the per-
case time spent by the contingent-fee lawyer, that cost savings is as sure 
to be passed on to plaintiffs as the cost savings the contingent-fee lawyer 
would get from reduced out-of-pocket expenses for things like travel to 
depositions.  Therefore, if arbitration has lower process costs, this 
advantage for arbitration should be reflected in the court’s assessment of 
a costs-based challenge to an arbitration agreement even if the plaintiff 
has a contingent-fee agreement that requires her lawyer to advance such 
costs. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Adhesive arbitration agreements are controversial; their 
enforcement is opposed by many commentators.  Nevertheless, the 
general enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements benefits society 
as a whole by reducing process costs and, in particular, benefits most 
consumers, employees and other adhering parties.  Those who dispute 
this are apparently focused on the few consumers and employees who 
are harmed by enforceable arbitration agreements, that is, the few 
consumers and employees who have claims that could lead to a big-
dollar jury award.  In contrast to this myopic focus on the few, a more 
complete view of adhesive arbitration agreements would consider the 
majority of consumers and employees who benefit from their 
enforcement, that is, those who never have a dispute (but benefit from 
the better price or wage generated by arbitration’s lower costs to 
businesses) and those who have the sort of small-yet-meritorious case 
that does not attract a lawyer to take the case to court.  Fortunately, 
typical adhesive arbitration agreements are generally enforceable under a 
proper (ex ante) application of the unconscionability doctrine, and are 
probably enforceable under the “effectively vindicate” doctrine. 
While current law poses little threat to the enforceability of typical 
adhesive arbitration agreements, the same cannot be said of adhesive 
arbitration agreements that prohibit class adjudication.  Such agreements 
are too-often falling due to several courts taking the narrow ex post 
perspective of considering how the arbitration agreement affects the 
adhering party (usually the plaintiff), given the existence of the particular 
 
 130. Id. 
2006] ADHESIVE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 293 
dispute that gave rise to the litigation,131 rather than the more complete 
ex ante perspective of considering the arbitration agreement as of the 
time it was formed.  If courts took the ex ante perspective on the effects 
of an arbitration agreement that prohibits class adjudication, they would 
consider, not just the reduction in the value of the claim the plaintiff 
turned out to have, but also the increase in the value of the other claims 
the plaintiff could have had and the better price or wage the plaintiff 
received due to both the arbitration agreement and its prohibition on 
class adjudication. 
Finally, there is the troubling development of courts holding 
adhesive arbitration agreements unenforceable simply because they 
require plaintiffs to pay forum fees higher than those required in 
litigation.  Rather than make this error of treating one cost of arbitration 
in isolation, courts should reject costs-based challenges unless the total 
costs of pursuing a claim in arbitration significantly exceed the total costs 
the plaintiff would face in litigation.  Under this standard, most adhesive 
arbitration agreements should survive costs-based challenges because the 
streamlined process of most arbitrations will result in process-cost 
savings for plaintiffs that more than offset the difference in filing fees.  
And, contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s Morrison opinion, this point holds 
even when the plaintiff’s lawyer is working for a contingency fee. 
 
 
 131. See supra notes 75-76. 
